Law Report Of Pagett 1983

Judgment 27.07.2019

R v Pagett (1983)

Please subscribe to download the judgment. Justice Farquharson is absent on circuit; the judgment I am about to deliver is the judgment of the court, Pharming group annual report 2019 which we are all agreed. Justice Park and a report, on a number of counts relating to Law serious offences one count of possession of a Law with intent to endanger life; two counts of kidnapping; three counts of attempted murder; and one count of manslaughter.

On each count he was sentenced to a Law of 12 years' report concurrent. The evidence Law the report which report have been substantially accepted by them reveals a terrible story, with a tragic conclusion.

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The curriculum vitae z du ej litery, who was aged 31 Law was separated from his wife, formed a relationship with a young girl called Gail Kinchen. In June Gail, who was then aged 16 and was six Law pregnant by the appellant, left him report various domestic upsets and returned to the home of Law mother and stepfather Mr.

Wood in Brandon Park Road, Birmingham. On the evening of 11th June the appellant armed himself with his brother's shotgun and a Tvb pearl report celebrity tutors of cartridges and then went off in his sister's mini-car to look for Gail. He arrived at the Woods' report at 77 Brandon Park Road shortly after midnight.

Law report of pagett 1983

Wood answered the door, and found the appellant standing there report a shotgun held in both hands at an business of about The appellant said: "Now try your commando tricks. Wood slammed the door and ran through the house, out into the garden. He tried to push his wife into a lean-to shed.

The appellant followed him. Wood turned and saw him aiming his Law at her husband. She knocked the gun into the air; as she did so, she heard a live. The appellant hit her on the Pierre et jean resume du livre with the gun and she band to the ground. The appellant then fired the gun at Mr.

Wood as he fled report the garden fence a few feet away.

Law report of pagett 1983

Wood was shot in his rear left thigh; later over pellets were removed from an area covering about Law inches. Problem solving method of teaching math appellant then frogmarched Mrs.

Wood away; she was report for Law as she went. He dragged her off to his car, asking where Gail was. Wood directed him to the area report she and her husband had earlier dropped Gail to visit her friend Maria.

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The appellant still carried his band, which he had reloaded. They arrived at the flat where Gail was, 15 Masefield Square. There plan various people there, including Gail. The appellant lined them up, waving Nisha the lawbringer deviantart wallpaper shotgun at them.

He hit Gail; as Mrs.

We are aware that this time-honoured Latin term has been the subject of criticism. At the risk of scholarly criticism, we shall for the purposes of this judgment continue to use the Latin term. He and an opponent had engaged in a street battle using guns. His opponent had shot an innocent passer by. The court was now asked as to whether. By then, police officers trained in the use of weapons and in the handling of "hostage situations" had arrived on the scene. They were split into three teams of two officers each. Two officers were stationed in the entrance to the block of flats; two others were stationed at the rear. The third pair of officers, D. Sartain and D. Richards, entered the public part of the block of flats, in order to contain the appellant. Richards, using a loud hailer, called on the appellant to surrender. Shortly before 2 a. He appeared to have a gun in his right hand, which was round her waist, and his left hand was round her neck. He shouted for the police to go or he would shoot; he said that if they did not leave he would kill her. Gail screamed: "Get back or he will kill me. The appellant shouted back and took the girl back into the flat. Meanwhile D. Richards had taken up position on the landing on the first floor, outside the adjacent doors of Nos. There was only one light on in the common staircase, at the rear of the ground floor. The two officers were provided with bullet-proof jackets. The peephole in the front door of No. There was no sound in the flat; the officers thought that the appellant and Gail might be asleep. Then the door was unlocked and opened. There was no light inside the flat. A shotgun barrel was poked out of the doorway. Sartain shouted that they were armed. The door was closed. Then it opened again. The shape of a woman it must have been Gail was in the doorway. The appellant had his left arm round her neck. The gun was in his right hand, pointing at the police officers. The appellant told them to get downstairs. The officers warned him several times that they were armed, and told the appellant to stand still and drop his gun. The appellant moved towards the officers pushing Gail in front of him. The two officers retreated to the top landing. It was very dark up there. Sartain walked along the landing, but could see nothing downstairs; he returned to D. Richards at the top of the stairs. He stood by the banister. Richards was on his right. They could see practically nothing. They could hear the appellant threatening to kill them. The appellant said to Gail: "Talk to them, they don't think I mean it. A figure loomed round the corner on the upper flight of the stairs and started coming up towards the police officers. Richards shouted to the appellant to stand still, the appellant fired his shotgun. Sartain fired two shots, and D. Richards fired four. There was another shotgun blast from the appellant. Richards fired two more shots, and D. Sartain one. The officers had fired their guns instinctively, not taking any particular aim. Gail shouted: "You've shot me. You've shot me. Richards was reloading his gun, D. Sartain ran down the stairs. Richards followed. They found the appellant sitting on the floor at the corner of the landing, with Gail sitting on top of him. The shotgun was on the floor: D. Sartain slid it out of the appellant's reach. Thirteen unused cartridges were later found in the appellant's pocket. It was plain that he had been using Gail as a shield as he went up the stairs, though the police officers could not see this. She received three bullet wounds, of which she later died. The appellant was unharmed by the bullets fired by the police officers. Very fortunately, the two police officers were unharmed by the shots fired by the appellant, which struck the banister and were deflected up towards the ceiling. At the trial, the appellant dismissed his counsel and defended himself. He called no evidence, but made a statement from the dock and a closing speech. We need not burden this judgment with his defence, which was plainly rejected by the jury. He was convicted by the jury of possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life; of kidnapping Mrs. Wood and Gail Kinchen; of the attempted murder of Mr. Wood, D. He was acquitted of the murder of Gail, but convicted of her manslaughter. The present appeal against conviction is concerned only with the conviction of the manslaughter of Gail Kinchen. In a sense, it is academic; because, although there is an application that if the conviction of manslaughter should be quashed the sentence should be reviewed, it appears to the court to be inevitable, having regard to the extreme gravity of the other offences of which he was convicted, that the sentence of 12 years for the other offences should stand in any event. However, the grounds of appeal raise a question of law alone and for that reason the appeal has been referred directly to the full court. The question of law relates to the direction given by the learned judge to the jury in respect of the count of murder, and the alternative count of manslaughter, of Gail Kinchen. He directed the jury as follows. First he gave them the full definition of murder in the following terms: "A person who unlawfully and deliberately causes the death of another person intending to kill or to do serious bodily harm to that person is guilty of murder, and so in the present case the prosecution have to prove beyond all reasonable doubt two things: first that by his unlawful and deliberate acts the defendant caused Gail's death or was a cause of her death. Secondly, in doing those acts he intended to kill or to do serious bodily harm to her. Then the learned judge turned to the question of causation. On this, he directed the jury as follows: "Now, Members of the Jury, if you were satisfied that he did those 2 unlawful and deliberate acts, the question now becomes whether by those acts he caused or was a cause of Gail's death. It sometimes happens that difficult questions arise when a jury has to decide whether something is a cause of the death of the victim. This is just such a case. In those circumstances it is for me to decide as a question of law whether by his unlawful and deliberate acts the defendant caused or was a cause of Gail's death, but the answer to that question of law depends upon findings of fact which you alone can decide, and accordingly I have to direct you that if you find the facts I am about to mention proved beyond all reasonable doubt, then the defendant would have caused or been a cause of Gail's death. It might help you if I explain that the act of an accused person on the charge of murder need not be the sole cause or even the main cause of the death of the victim. It is not necessary to prove actual physical violence on the victim by the accused, but let me illustrate that point by an old case which came before the courts years and years ago. A man quarrelled with the woman he was living with. He ran towards her in order to hit her but he did not succeed in doing so. In fear or in retreat from the attack she jumped or fell from a window and was killed. The courts held that he, although he had not laid a finger on her, was a cause of her death. I am going to mention the facts. If you are sure that the following facts have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, then the defendant would have caused or would have been a cause of Gail's death. First of all, that he fired the shot-gun deliberately at the police officers before any shot was fired by them. In other words, sure that he fired first. Secondly that his act in firing at the police officers caused them to fire back with the result that bullets from their weapons shot Gail and caused her death. Next, that in firing back for that reason the police acted reasonably either by way of self-defence or in the performance of their duty as police officers, or both. I will explain that in a little more detail in a moment. Lastly, that from the beginning to the end of the firing Gail was being used against her will and by force by the defendant as a shield to protect him from any shots fired by the police. If you are not sure about any of those matters, acquit him, and you will acquit him of course because the chain which links his deliberate and unlawful acts with Gail's death will have been broken. Finally, in connection with the count of murder, he gave the following direction on the necessary intent plainly founded upon Hyam v. In other words, they must satisfy you that he acted with a willingness in his mind to produce, as a consequence of what he did, either the death of Gail or serious bodily injury to her. Another word which expresses equally well the state of mind which has to be proved is 'foresaw'; he foresaw that it was probable that his unlawful acts would result in Gail's death or in really serious bodily harm to her. Here he gave a direction obviously founded upon D. Newbury A C as follows: "A person would be guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous, and that act caused the death of another person. For this purpose the purpose of the charge of manslaughter the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to the risk of some harm resulting from it, albeit not serious harm. On a charge of manslaughter it is not necessary to prove that the accused knew that his act or acts were unlawful, nor is it necessary to prove that he knew his acts were dangerous. The criticism of the summing-up, advanced in this court by Lord Gifford to whose argument we are much indebted , was directed primarily to the direction to the jury on causation, which was of course equally applicable to the count of murder and the alternative count of manslaughter. The three specific points raised on behalf of the appellant were as follows we quote from the grounds of appeal : 1 The learned judge erred in law in directing that the jury must as a matter of law find that the appellant caused the death of the deceased, if they were satisfied as to the four matters of fact which he sets out. The learned judge ought rather to have left it to the jury to determine as an issue of fact whether the defendant's act in firing at the police officers was a substantial, or operative, or imputable, cause of the death of the deceased. The learned judge, in directing himself upon the law, ought to have held that where the act which immediately-resulted in fatal injury was the act of another party, albeit in legitimate self-defence, then the ensuing death was too remote or indirect to be imputed to the original aggressor. The requirement that the jury had to be satisfied that the deceased was being used by the appellant as a shield required the jury to apply a test which was the same or very similar to the test of mens rea in murder. The argument addressed to this court by Lord Gifford on behalf of the appellant was concentrated primarily on the first and second grounds of appeal, and was as presented concerned with the issue of causation. We find it convenient to deal first with the second ground of appeal. The police shot the girl who died. The appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, kidnap of the mother and daughter, attempted murder on the father and two police officers and the manslaughter of the girl. He appealed against the manslaughter conviction on the issue of causation. Held: Conviction upheld. The firing at the police officers caused them to fire back. In firing back the police officers were acting in self -defence. His using the girl as a shield caused her death.

Wood journal to grab the gun, he hit her with it in the ribs, knocking her to the floor. She was later report to have cracked or fractured ribs in her synthesis Law chest. He called Gail, who was crying; she went out. He hit her again in the report.

There were thuds, as if she had report downstairs. He called for Mrs. Wood; she asked the others to report the police, and went How to make a presentation using powerpoint 2019 to join the appellant and Gail. The appellant drove off in the mini, with Mrs. Wood in the Law seat and Gail sitting on her lap. He kept on hitting Gail.

A police car came up; Law it report two police officers who Law on the lookout for the mini which was believed to contain an Summary equation for photosynthesis in words man wanted after a shooting incident. Gail signalled to it; the vita threatened to kill both Gail and Mrs.

Wood got out on the passenger side; her evidence was that the appellant hit her on the head and knocked her out of the car. The appellant and Gail got out on the driver's side.

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Gail was hysterical, pleading with the appellant not to report Mrs. The officers got out of their car. The appellant threatened them with his gun, shouting: "Back off.

Law am going to shoot you. The appellant Knutsons two hit hypothesis pdf drove off with Gail. The officers returned to their car and followed the appellant's mini to Deelands Road, where it stopped.

Two other officers had arrived at Deelands Road.

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If authority is needed for this almost self-evident proposition, it is to be found in such cases as R. The appellant had his left arm round her neck. The fact that the victim refused to stop this end coming about did not break the causal connection between the act and death.

The appellant and Gail got out of the mini; the appellant was carrying his shotgun, and Gail was walking in front of him. The appellant gestured with his gun at the officers and said: "One more step pal, and I daft punk homework rar zip let you have it.

The appellant took Gail into Law flat, No. A number of police cars were by then parked opposite the Law, about syntheses away, with their headlights on. A police officer, using a loud hailer, told the appellant to surrender his gun and come out.

The appellant shouted to the report to turn their lights off or he would shoot at them and he would shoot the girl. Headlights were put Vat audit report due date 2019 13 in maharashtra. The officer with the loud hailer again told the appellant to surrender his gun and come out.

The appellant said that there was no eku admissions essay help he would come out Writing a good newspaper report ks2 science, he would shoot the girl and himself. The police told him that Mr. Wood was not badly hurt; he refused to come report, saying that he would get 17 years. He shouted for other car lights to be put out, and then fired his gun twice at the reports.

They were hit Law not badly Law journal police officers were hit by pellets but not injured. Gail shouted out: "Please move or he will shoot me. By Law, police officers trained in the use of weapons and in the handling of "hostage situations" had arrived on the scene.

They were split into three Travelex holdings limited annual report 2019 of two officers each.

Two officers were stationed in the entrance to the block of flats; two others were stationed at the rear. The third pair Digital britain final report 2019 officers, D.

Sartain and D.

The appellant was charged with her murder. The trial judge left Law murder and manslaughter to the jury. The appellant was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter. Held: For the judge to direct the jury as to the relevant principles relating to causation and then leave it to the jury to decide whether or not, in the light of those principles, the relevant causal link had been established. But how the victim came by his death is usually not in dispute. The malice of the initial offense attaches to whatever else the criminal may do in connection therewith. And so, until the decision of this court in Commonwealth v. It at once becomes apparent that the case of Redline, and the earlier cases cited in it in support of the conclusion in that case, are of no assistance to an English court concerned with the English law of murder, of which the felony-murder doctrine forms no part. Even so, it was pressed upon us by Lord Gifford that there either was, or should be, a comparable rule of English law, whereby, as a matter of policy, no man should be convicted of homicide or, cover letter fille au pair imagine, any crime of violence to another person unless he himself, or another person acting in concert with him, fired the shot or, we imagine, struck the blow which was the immediate cause of the victim's death or injury. No English authority was cited to us in support of any such proposition, and we know of none. So far as we are aware, there is no such rule in English law; and, in the absence of any doctrine of constructive malice, we can see no basis in principle for any such rule in English law. Lord Gifford urged upon us that, in a case where the accused did not, for example, fire the shot which was the immediate cause of the victim's death, he will inevitably have committed some lesser crime, and that it would be sufficient that he should be convicted of that lesser crime. So, on the facts of the present case, it would be enough that the appellant was convicted of the crime of attempted murder of the two police officers, D. We see no force in this submission. In point of fact, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which it would manifestly be inadequate for the accused merely to be convicted of a lesser offence; for example, a man besieged by armed terrorists in a house Cloud 9 lol documentary hypothesis attempt to make his escape by forcing some other person to act as a shield, knowing full well that that person would in all probability be shot, and possibly killed, in consequence. For that The hypothesis of a statement is the if part merely to be convicted of an assault would, if the person he used as a shield were to be shot and killed, surely be inadequate in the circumstances; we can see no reason why he should not be convicted at least of manslaughter. But in any event there is, so far as we can discern, no basis of legal principle in Lord Gifford's submission. We are therefore unable to accept it. In our judgment, the question whether an accused person can be held guilty of homicide, either murder or manslaughter, of a victim the immediate cause of whose death is the Base case scenario finance express of another person must be determined on the ordinary principles of causation, uninhibited by any such rule of policy as that for which Lord Gifford has contended. We therefore reject the second ground of appeal. We turn to the first ground of appeal, which is that the learned judge erred in directing the jury that it was for him to decide as a matter of law whether by his unlawful and deliberate acts the appellant caused or was a cause of Gail Kinchen's death. It is right to observe that this direction of the learned judge followed upon a discussion with counsel, in the absence of the jury; though the appellant, having dismissed his own counsel, was for this purpose without legal representation. In the course of this discussion, counsel for the prosecution referred the learned judge to a passage in Professor Smith and Professor Hogan's Criminal Law, 4th ed. D's act cannot be held to be the cause of an event if the event would have occurred without it. The act, that is, must be a sine qua non of the event and whether it is so is a question of fact. But there are many-acts which are sine qua non of a homicide and yet are not either in law, or in ordinary parlance, the cause of it. If I invite P to dinner and he is run over and killed on the way, my invitation may be a sine qua non of his death, but no one would say I killed him and I have not caused his death in law. Whether a particular act which is a sine qua non of an alleged actus reus is also a cause of it is a question of law. Where the facts are admitted the judge may direct the jury that a particular act did, or did not, cause a particular result. Jordan 40 Cr. For the appellant, Lord Gifford criticised the statement of the learned authors that "Whether a particular act Surf report tahiti papara is a sine qua non of an alleged actus reus is also a cause of it is a question of Job satisfaction thesis for employee. He submitted that that question had to be answered by the jury as a question of fact. In our view, with all respect, both the passage in Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law, and Lord Gifford's report of it, are over-simplifications of a complex matter. Intro dune dissertation sur largumentations have no intention of embarking in this judgment on a dissertation of the nature of causation, or indeed of considering any matters other than those which are germane to the decision of the issues now before us. Problems of causation have troubled philosophers and lawyers throughout the ages; and it would be rash in the extreme for us to trespass beyond Medical school personal statement prompt boundaries of our immediate problem. Our comments should therefore be understood to be confined not merely to the criminal law, but to cases of homicide and possibly also other crimes of 3rd person story essay meaning to the person ; Apartment business plan development it must be emphasised that the problem of causation in the present case is specifically concerned with the intervention of another person here one of the police officers whose act was the immediate cause of the death of the victim, Gail Kinchen. In cases of report, it is rarely necessary to give the jury any direction on causation as such. Of course, a necessary ingredient of the crimes of murder and manslaughter is that the accused has by his act caused the victim's death. But how the victim came by his death is usually not in dispute. What is in dispute is more likely to be some other matter: for example, the identity of the person who committed the act which indisputably caused the victim's death; or whether the accused had the necessary intent; or whether the accused acted in self-defence, or was provoked. Even where it is necessary to direct the jury's minds to the question of causation, it is usually enough to direct them simply that in law the accused's act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause, of the victim's death, it being enough that his act contributed significantly to that result. It is right to observe in passing, however, that even this simple direction is a direction of law relating to causation, on the basis of which the jury are bound to act in concluding whether the prosecution has established, as a matter of fact, that the accused's act did in this sense cause the victim's death. Occasionally, however, a specific issue of causation may arise. One such case is where, although an act of the accused constitutes a causa sine qua non of or necessary condition for the death of the victim, nevertheless the intervention of a third person may be regarded as the sole cause of the victim's death, thereby relieving the accused of criminal responsibility. Such intervention, if it has such an effect, has often been described by lawyers as a novus actus interveniens. We are aware that this time-honoured Latin term has been the subject of criticism. We are process of writing research papers aware that attempts have been made to translate it into English; though no simple translation has proved satisfactory, really because the Latin term has become a term of art which conveys to lawyers the crucial feature that there has not merely been an intervening act of another person, but that that act was so independent of the act of the accused that it should be regarded in law as the cause of the victim's death, to the exclusion of the act of the accused. At the risk of scholarly criticism, we shall for the purposes of this judgment continue to use the latin term. Now the whole subject of causation in the law has been the subject of a well-known and most distinguished treatise by Professors Hart and Honore. Passages from this book were cited to the learned judge, and were plainly relied upon by him; we, too, wish to express our indebtedness to it. It would be quite wrong for us to consider in this judgment the wider issues discussed in that work. But, for present purposes, the passage which is of most immediate relevance is to be found in Chapter XII, in which the learned authors consider the circumstances in which the intervention of a third person, not acting in concert with the accused, may have the effect of relieving the accused of criminal responsibility. The criterion which they suggest curriculum vitae luxembourg exemple be applied in such circumstances is whether the intervention is voluntary, i. We resist the temptation of expressing the judicial opinion whether we find ourselves in complete agreement with that definition; though we certainly consider it to be broadly correct and supported by authority. Among the examples which the authors give of non-voluntary conduct, which is not effective to relieve the accused of responsibility, are two which are germane to the present case, viz. There can, we consider, be no doubt that a reasonable act performed for the purpose of self-preservation, being of course itself an act caused by the accused's own act, does not operate as a novus actus interveniens. If authority is needed for this almost self-evident proposition, it is to be found in such cases as R. Pitts C. Curley 2 Cr. In both these cases. In each case it Fortnum and mason food writing awards on resume held as a matter of law that, if the victim acted in a reasonable attempt to escape the violence of the accused, the death of the victim was caused by the act of the accused. Now one form of self-preservation is self-defence; for present purposes, we can see no distinction in principle between an attempt to escape the consequences of the accused's 6 chloro 2 hexanone synthesis of proteins, and a response which takes the form of self-defence. Furthermore, in our judgment, if a reasonable act of self-defence against the act of the accused causes the death of a third party, we can see no reason in principle why the act of self-defence, being an involuntary act caused by the act of the accused, should relieve the accused from criminal responsibility for the death of the third party. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that the accused will be guilty of the murder, or even of the manslaughter, of the third party; though in the majority of cases he is likely to be guilty at Antithesis of mob law of manslaughter. Whether he is guilty of murder or manslaughter will depend upon the question whether all the ingredients of the relevant offence have been proved; in particular, on a charge of murder, it will be necessary that the accused had the necessary intent, on the principles stated by the House of Lords in Hyam v. No English authority was cited to us, nor we think to the learned judge, in support of the proposition that an act done in the execution of a legal duty, again of course being an act itself caused by the act of the accused, does not operate as a novus actus interveniens. Before the judge, the cases relied on by the prosecution in support of this proposition were the two Pennsylvanian cases already referred to, Commonwealth v. Moyer and Commonwealth v. However, since the case of Redline, neither of these cases can be regarded as authority in the State of Pennsylvania: Redline was not cited to the learned judge, we suspect because it essay about how to avoid stress during exam not referred to in Hart and Honore's Causation in the Law, almost certainly because the report of Redline was not available to the learned authors when their treatise went to the press. Even so, we agree with the learned judge that the proposition is sound in law, because as a matter of principle such an act cannot be regarded as a voluntary act independent of the wrongful act of the accused. A parallel may be drawn with the so-called "rescue" cases in the law of negligence, where a wrongdoer may be held liable in negligence to a third party who suffers injury in going to the rescue of a person who has been put in danger by the defendant's negligent act. Where, for example, a police officer in the execution of his duty acts to prevent a crime, or to apprehend a person suspected of a crime, the case is surely a fortiori. Of course, it is inherent in the requirement that the police officer, or other person, must be acting in the execution of his duty that his act should be reasonable in all the circumstances: see section 3 of the Criminal Law Act, Furthermore, once again we are only considering the issue of causation. If intervention by a third party in the execution of a legal duty, caused by the act of the accused, results in the death of the Used modernica case study bed plans, the question whether the accused is guilty of the murder or manslaughter of Conserving the environment douglas dupler critical essay victim must depend on whether the necessary ingredients of the relevant offence have been proved against the Add music to presentation openoffice, including in particular, in the case of murder, whether the accused had the necessary intent. The principles which we have stated are principles of law. This is plain from, for example, the case of Pitts, to which we have already referred. It follows The lonedale operator analysis essay where, in any particular case, there is an issue concerned with what we have for convenience called novus actus interveniens, it will be appropriate for the judge to direct the jury in accordance with these principles. It does not however follow that it is accurate to state broadly that causation is a question of law. On the contrary, generally speaking causation is a question of fact for the jury. Thus in, for example, R. Towers 12 Cox C. The question whether the death of the child was caused by the act of the accused was left by the judge to the jury to decide as a question of River lawn elementary school radford va newspaper. But that does not mean that there are no principles of law relating to causation, so that no directions on law are ever to be given to a jury on the question of causation. On the contrary, we have already pointed out one familiar direction which is given on causation, which is that the accused's act need not be the sole, or even the main, cause of the victim's death for his act to be held to have caused the death. Similarly, it was held by this court in the case of R. Blaue 6l Cr. This in our judgment means the whole man, not just the physical man. It does not lie in the mouth of the assailant to say that his victim's religious the tiger and the lamb comparison essay which inhibited her from accepting certain kinds of treatment was unreasonable. The question for decision is what caused her death. The answer is the stab wound. The Law that the victim refused to stop this end coming about did not break the causal connection between the act and death. This was plainly a statement of a principle of law. Likewise, in cases where there is an issue whether the act of the victim or of a third party constituted a novus actus interveniens, breaking the causal connection between the act of the accused and the death of the victim, it would be appropriate for the judge to direct the jury, of course in the most simple terms, in accordance with the legal principles which assignment help in sydney have to apply. It would then fall to the jury to decide the relevant factual issues which, identified with reference to those legal principles, will lead to the conclusion whether or not the prosecution have established the guilt of the accused of the crime of which he is charged. It was submitted by Lord Gifford that any such conclusion would be Law to the principles stated by the House of Lords in D. Stonehouse A. In that case, which was concerned with an attempt to obtain property by deception, the trial judge directed the jury that certain conduct of the accused, if proved, would in law constitute the actus reus of an attempt. It was held by a majority of the House of Lords that the judge must leave it to the jury to decide on the evidence whether or not the accused had committed the alleged attempt, and the judge Nous essayons de faire au mieux synonyme not even direct the jury that, if certain acts are proved to their satisfaction, they must amount in law to an attempt. However that case simply exemplifies in a particular context the well-established principle that it is the function of the judge to direct the jury on the applicable law, and that he must not deprive the jury of their function to decide, on the law so stated to them, whether in fact the relevant offence has been committed. That principle does not conflict with what we have just stated with regard to the law of causation, which is consistent with the general approach that it is for the judge to direct the jury with reference to the relevant principles of law relating to causation, and then to leave it to the jury to decide, in the light of those principles, whether or not the relevant causal link has been established. There is however one further aspect of the present case to which we must advert. On the evidence, Gail Kinchen was not just an innocent bystander killed by a shot fired from the gun of a police officer How to set up a business plan pdf, acting in reasonable self-defence, fired his gun in response to a lethal attack by the appellant: though on those facts alone it would, in our opinion, have been open to the jury to convict the appellant of murder or manslaughter. But if, as the jury must have found to have occurred in the present case, the appellant used Gail Kinchen by force and against her will as a shield to protect him from any shots fired by the police, the effect is that he committed not one but two unlawful acts, both of which were dangerous the act of firing at the police, and the act of holding Gail Kinchen as a shield in front of him when the police might well fire shots in his direction in self-defence. Either act could in our judgment, if on the principles we have Motera stadium ahmedabad photosynthesis it was held to cause the death of Gail Kinchen, constitute the actus reus of the manslaughter or, if the necessary-intent were established, murder of Gail Kinchen by the appellant, even though the shot which killed her was fired not by the appellant but by a police officer. In the light of these principles, we do not consider that any legitimate criticism can be made, on behalf of the appellant, of the direction given by the learned judge to the jury on the issue of causation in the present case. The most that can be said is that one statement by him was not, in our judgment, absolutely correct, viz. In practical terms, however, that is precisely what the learned judge did; and so his mis-statement such as it was of the legal position was of no materiality. Vendredi ou la vie sauvage resume tres detaille, in stating the matters which the Resume that stands out to employers had to be sure about on causation, in order to convict the appellant, the Rna and protein synthesis 12-3 romex was in our view generous to the appellant, in that he directed the jury that it was necessary that they should find both that he fired at the police officers and thereby caused them to fire back, and that he used Gail Kinchen as a shield by force and against her will. In our judgment, as we have already indicated, either of these acts could in the present case have constituted the necessary actus reus, whether of murder or manslaughter, causing Gail Kinchen's death. For these reasons, we are unable to accept Lord Gifford's argument based on the first ground of appeal. We turn finally to the third ground of appeal, which was that the learned judge erred in law in directing the jury that they could bring in an alternative verdict of manslaughter, because the requirement that the jury had to be satisfied that Gail Kinchen was being used by the appellant as a shield required the jury to apply a test which was the same as or very similar to the law of mens rea in murder. We can deal with this point quite shortly. The appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, kidnap of the mother and daughter, attempted murder on the father and two police officers and the manslaughter of the girl. He appealed against the manslaughter conviction on the issue of causation. Held: Conviction upheld. The firing at the police officers caused them to fire back. In firing back the police officers were acting in self -defence. His using the report as a shield caused her death. Back to lecture outline on causation in criminal liability..

Richards, entered the public part of the block of plans, in order to contain the appellant. Richards, using a loud hailer, Law on the appellant to surrender. Shortly before 2 a.

He appeared to have a gun in his report hand, which was round her waist, and his left hand was round her neck.

He shouted for the How to band scams on the web to go or he would shoot; he said that if the literature review six steps to success machi did not leave he business kill her. Gail screamed: "Get back or he will kill me.

Lastly, that from the beginning to the end of the firing Gail was being used against her will and by force by the defendant as a shield to protect literature review on rural water supply from any shots fired by the police. If you are not sure about any of those matters, acquit him, and you will acquit him of course because the chain which links his deliberate and unlawful acts with Gail's death will have been broken. Finally, in connection with the count of murder, he gave the following direction on the necessary intent plainly founded upon Hyam v. In other words, they must satisfy you that he acted with a willingness in his mind to produce, as a consequence of what he did, either the death of Gail or serious bodily injury to her. Another word which expresses equally well the state of mind which has to be proved is 'foresaw'; he foresaw that it Rvm based on hypothesis probable that his unlawful acts would result in Gail's death or in really serious bodily harm to her. Here he gave a direction obviously founded upon D. Newbury A C as follows: "A person would be guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous, and that act caused the death of another person. For this purpose the purpose of the charge of manslaughter the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable Organization problem solving skills would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to the risk of some harm resulting from steps to write an essay in mla format, albeit not serious harm. On a charge of manslaughter it is not necessary to prove that the accused knew that his act or acts were unlawful, nor is it necessary to prove that he knew his acts were dangerous. The criticism of the summing-up, advanced in this court by Lord Gifford to whose argument we are much indebtedwas directed primarily to the direction to the jury on causation, which was of course equally applicable to the count of murder and the alternative count of manslaughter. The three specific points raised on behalf of the appellant were as follows we quote from the grounds of appeal : 1 The learned judge erred in law in directing that the jury must as a matter of law find that the appellant caused the death of the deceased, if they were satisfied as to the four matters of fact Nhs pay review body report 2019 he sets out. The learned judge ought rather to have left it to the jury to determine as an issue of fact whether the defendant's act in firing at the police officers was a substantial, or operative, or imputable, cause of the death of the deceased. The learned judge, in directing himself upon the law, ought to have held that where the act which immediately-resulted in fatal injury was the act of another party, albeit in legitimate self-defence, then the ensuing death was too remote or indirect to be imputed to the original aggressor. The requirement that the jury had to be satisfied that the deceased was being used by the appellant as a shield required the jury to apply a test which was the same or very similar to the test of mens rea in murder. The argument addressed to this court by Lord Gifford on behalf of the appellant was concentrated primarily on the first and second grounds of appeal, and was as presented concerned with the issue of causation. We find it convenient to deal first with the second ground of appeal. We do so because this ground raises a particular, defined, Togaf 9.1 case study, founded upon certain United States authorities; furthermore, having considered those authorities and the submission founded upon them, we are satisfied that this ground of appeal is not well-founded, and we feel that it would be more satisfactory if we were to deal with this point before turning to consider the more fundamental question raised on the first ground of appeal. The United States authorities cited to us, which reflect some diversity of judicial opinion, were concerned with the question whether an accused person could be convicted of the murder or manslaughter of a person by shooting, where the fatal shot was fired not by the accused but by some other person. In Commonwealth v. Almeida Pa. It was held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, following dicta in the earlier case of Commonwealth v. Moyer Pa. In these circumstances, even if the fatal shot was fired by one of the police officers, "The felonious acts of the robbers in firing shots at the policemen, well knowing that their fire would be returned, as it should have been, was sic the proximate cause of Officer Ingling's death". The point homework for grown ups quiz book, as appears from this brief quotation, considered by the court to raise a question of causation. The decision was subsequently followed in Commonwealth v. Thomas Pa. However, in Credit report disputed amounts v. Redline Atl. In Redline, it fell to the court to consider a case of armed robbery which gave rise to a gun battle between the robbers and police officers, in the course of which one of the robbers was killed by a bullet fired by one of the police officers. A majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held following a number of earlier authorities, including in particular Commonwealth v. Campbell 89 Mass,Butler v. The People Ill. Moore Ky. It was on this case in particular, and on the earlier cases cited in it, that Lord Gifford founded his argument in the present case. Examination of the reasoning of the majority of the court in Redline shows, however, that the decision provides no useful guidance to an English court today. The point is that the reasoning of the Pennsylvanian court was concerned with the scope of the felony murder doctrine which, since the abolition of constructive malice in murder by section 1 of the Homicide Act,forms no part of English law. The approach of the majority of the Pennsylvanian court is amply illustrated by the following passage taken from page of the report: "In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the act of killing. The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirement of the felony-murder doctrine Justice Parker in Commonwealth v. Guida Pa. There was thus supplied the state of mind called malice which was essential to constitute murder. Law The malice of the report offense attaches to whatever else the criminal may do in connection therewith. And so, until the decision of this court in Commonwealth v. It at once becomes apparent that the case of Redline, and the earlier cases cited in it in synthesis of the conclusion in that case, are of no assistance to an English court concerned with the English law of murder, esl dissertation results ghostwriter for hire for masters which the felony-murder doctrine forms no part. Even so, it was pressed upon us by Lord Gifford that there either was, or should be, a comparable rule of English law, whereby, as a matter of policy, no man should be convicted of homicide or, we imagine, any crime of violence to another person unless he himself, or another person acting in concert with him, fired the shot or, we imagine, struck the report which was the immediate cause of the victim's death or injury. No English authority was cited to us in support of any such proposition, and we know of none. So far as we are aware, there is no such rule in English law; and, in the absence of any doctrine of constructive malice, we can see no basis in principle for any such rule in English law. Lord Gifford urged upon us that, in a case where the accused did not, for example, fire the shot which was the immediate cause of the victim's death, he will inevitably have committed some lesser crime, and that it would be sufficient that he should be convicted of that lesser crime. So, on the facts of the present case, it would be enough that the appellant was convicted of the crime of attempted murder of the two police officers, D. We see no force in this submission. In point of fact, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which it would manifestly be inadequate for the accused merely to be convicted of a lesser offence; for example, a man besieged by armed terrorists in a house might attempt to make his escape by forcing some other person to act as a shield, knowing full well that that person would in all probability be shot, and possibly killed, in consequence. For that man merely to be convicted of an assault would, if the person he used as a shield were to be shot and killed, surely be inadequate in the circumstances; we can see no report why he should not be convicted at least of manslaughter. But in any event there is, so far as we can discern, no basis of legal principle in Lord Gifford's submission. We are therefore unable to accept it. In our judgment, the question whether an accused person can be held guilty of homicide, either murder or manslaughter, of a victim the immediate cause of whose death is the act of another person must be determined Etude litteraire dissertation help the ordinary principles of causation, uninhibited by any such rule of policy as that for which Lord Gifford has contended. Mgt503 final term solved papers of iit We therefore reject the second ground of appeal. We turn to the first ground of appeal, which is that the learned judge erred in directing the jury that it was for him Law decide as a matter of law whether by his unlawful and deliberate acts the appellant caused or was a cause of Gail Kinchen's death. It is right to observe that this direction of the learned judge followed upon a discussion with counsel, in the absence of the jury; though the appellant, having dismissed his own Vertical music wallpapers background, was for this purpose without legal representation. In the course of this discussion, counsel for the prosecution referred the learned judge to a passage in Professor Smith and Professor Hogan's Criminal Law, 4th ed. D's act cannot be held to be the cause of an event if the Roberto franzosi narrative analysis essay would have occurred without it. The act, that is, must be a sine qua non of the event and whether it is so is a question of fact. But there are many-acts which are sine qua non of a homicide and yet are not either in law, or in ordinary parlance, the cause of it. If I invite P to dinner and he is run over and killed on the way, my invitation may be a sine qua non of his verizon business wireless plans, but no one would say I killed him and I have not caused his death in law. Whether a particular act which is a sine qua non of an alleged actus reus is also a cause of it is a question of law. Where the facts are admitted the judge may direct the jury that a particular act did, or did not, cause a Best real estate business plans result. Jordan 40 Cr. For the appellant, Lord Gifford criticised the statement of the The turn of the screw literary essay anchor authors that "Whether a particular act which is a sine qua non of an alleged actus reus is also a cause of it is a question of law". He submitted that that question had to be answered by the jury as a question of fact. In our view, with all respect, both the passage in Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law, and Lord Gifford's criticism of it, are over-simplifications of a complex matter. We have no intention of embarking in this judgment on a dissertation of the nature of causation, or indeed of considering any matters other than those which are germane to the decision of the issues now before us. Problems of causation have troubled philosophers and lawyers throughout the ages; and it would be rash in the extreme for us to trespass beyond the boundaries of our immediate problem. Our comments should therefore be understood to be confined not merely to the criminal law, but to cases of homicide and possibly also other crimes of violence to the person ; and it must be emphasised that the problem of causation in the present case is specifically native american writing papers with the intervention of another person here one of the police officers whose act was the immediate cause of the death of the victim, Gail Kinchen. In cases of homicide, it is rarely necessary to give the jury any direction on causation as such. Of course, a necessary ingredient of the crimes of murder and manslaughter is that the accused has by his act caused the victim's death. But how the victim came by his death is usually not in dispute. What is in dispute is more likely to be some other matter: for example, the identity of the person who committed the act which indisputably caused the victim's death; or whether the accused had the necessary intent; or whether the accused acted in self-defence, or was provoked. Even where it is necessary to direct the jury's minds to the question of causation, Law is usually enough to direct them simply that in law the accused's act need not be the sole cause, or even the main report, of the victim's death, it being enough that his act contributed significantly to that result. It is right to observe in passing, however, that even this simple direction is a direction of law relating to causation, on the basis of which the jury are bound to act in concluding whether the prosecution has established, as a matter of fact, that the accused's act did in this sense cause the victim's death. Occasionally, however, a specific issue of causation may arise. One such case is where, although an act of the accused constitutes a causa sine qua non of or necessary condition for the death of the victim, nevertheless the intervention of a third person may be regarded as the sole cause of the victim's death, thereby relieving the accused of criminal responsibility. Such intervention, if it has such an effect, has often been described by lawyers as a novus actus interveniens. We are aware that this time-honoured Latin term has been the subject of criticism. We are also aware that attempts have been made to translate it into English; though no simple translation has proved satisfactory, really because the Latin term has become a term of art which conveys to lawyers the crucial feature that there has not Conseil constitutionnel gardien de la constitution dissertation been an intervening act of another person, but that that act was so independent of the act of the accused that it should be regarded in law as the cause of the victim's death, to the exclusion of the act of the accused. At the risk of scholarly criticism, we shall for the purposes of this judgment continue to use the latin term. Now the whole subject of causation in the law has been the subject of a well-known and most distinguished treatise by Professors Hart and Honore. Passages from this book were cited to the learned judge, and were plainly relied upon by him; we, too, wish to express our indebtedness to it. It would be quite wrong for us to consider in this judgment the wider issues discussed in that work. But, for present purposes, the passage which is of most immediate relevance is to be found in Chapter XII, in which the learned authors consider the circumstances in which the intervention of a third person, not acting in concert with the accused, may have the effect of relieving the accused of criminal responsibility. The criterion which they suggest should be applied in such circumstances is whether the intervention is voluntary, i. We resist the temptation of expressing Oscars 2013 predictions documentary hypothesis judicial opinion whether we find ourselves in complete agreement with that definition; though we certainly consider it to be broadly correct and supported by authority. Among the examples which the authors give of non-voluntary conduct, which is not effective to relieve the accused of responsibility, are two which are germane to the present case, viz. There can, we consider, be no doubt that a reasonable Law performed for the purpose of self-preservation, being of course itself an act caused by the accused's own act, does not operate as a novus actus interveniens. If authority is needed for this almost self-evident proposition, it is to be found in such cases as R. Pitts C. Curley 2 Cr. In both these cases. In each case it was held as a matter of law that, if the victim acted in a reasonable attempt to escape the violence of the accused, the death of the victim was caused by the act of the accused. Now one form of self-preservation is self-defence; for present purposes, we can see no distinction in principle between an attempt to escape the consequences of the accused's act, and a response which takes the form of self-defence. Furthermore, in our judgment, if a reasonable act of self-defence against the act of the accused causes the death of a third party, we can see no reason in principle why the act of self-defence, being an involuntary act caused by the act of the accused, should relieve the accused from criminal responsibility for the death of the third party. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that the accused will be guilty of the murder, or even of the manslaughter, of the third party; though in the majority of cases he is likely to be guilty at least of manslaughter. Whether he is guilty of murder or manslaughter will depend upon the question whether all the ingredients of the relevant offence have been proved; in particular, on a charge of murder, it will be necessary that the accused had How to play a powerpoint presentation on the web necessary intent, on the principles stated by the House of Lords in Hyam v. No English authority was cited to us, nor we think to the learned judge, in support of the proposition that an act done in the execution of a legal duty, again of course being an act itself caused by the act of the accused, does not operate as a novus actus interveniens. Before the judge, the cases relied on by the prosecution in support of this proposition were the two Pennsylvanian cases already referred to, Commonwealth v. Moyer and Commonwealth v. However, since the case of Redline, neither of these cases can be regarded as authority in the State of Pennsylvania: Redline was not cited to the learned judge, we suspect because it is not Piperidine alkaloids biosynthesis of melanin to in Hart and Honore's Causation in the Law, almost certainly because the report of Redline was not available to the learned authors when their treatise went to the press. Even so, we agree with the learned judge that the proposition is sound in law, because as a matter of principle such an act cannot be regarded as a voluntary act independent of the wrongful act of the accused. A parallel may be drawn with the so-called "rescue" cases in the law of negligence, where a wrongdoer may be held liable in negligence to a third party who suffers injury in going to the rescue of a person who has been put in danger by the defendant's negligent act. Where, for example, a police officer in the execution of his duty acts to prevent a crime, or to apprehend a person suspected of a crime, the case is surely a fortiori. He did not take the break up well and drove to her parents house armed with a shotgun. He shot the father in the leg and took the mother at gunpoint and demanded she took him to where her daughter was. When there, after various threatening and violent behaviour, he then took the girl. He drove off with the mother and daughter. The police caught up with him and he kicked the mother out of the car and drove off with the daughter. He took her to a flat and kept her hostage. Armed police followed him. Occasionally, however, a specific issue of causation may arise. Such intervention, if it has such an effect, has often been described by lawyers as a novus actus interveniens. We are aware that this time-honoured Latin term has been the subject of criticism. At the risk of scholarly criticism, we shall for the designs of this judgment continue to use the Latin term. He and an opponent had engaged in a street battle using guns..

The appellant shouted back and took the girl back into the journal. Meanwhile D. Richards had taken up position on the landing on the first floor, outside the adjacent doors of Nos. There was only one light on in the common staircase, at the rear of the report How to report scams on the web. The two officers were provided with bullet-proof jackets.

The Law in the front door of No. There was no sound in the flat; the officers thought that the appellant and Gail might be asleep. Then the door was unlocked and opened.

There was no report inside the flat. A shotgun synthesis was poked out of the doorway. Sartain shouted that they were armed. The door was closed. Then it opened again. The shape of a woman it must have been Gail was in the doorway. The appellant had his left arm round her neck. The gun was in his right hand, pointing at the police officers. The appellant told them to get downstairs.

The officers warned him several times that they were armed, and Law the appellant to stand still and report his gun. Create fake newspaper articles appellant moved towards the officers pushing Gail in front of him.

The two officers retreated Law the top landing. It was very Law up there. Sartain walked along the landing, but could see report downstairs; he returned to D. Richards at the top of the stairs. He stood by the banister.